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I. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS. 
Appellant Lochsa Falls, L.L.C. (hereinafter "Locsha Falls"), submitted a preliminary plat 
for its entire subdivision and obtained approval from the City of Meridian. The preliminary plat 
clearly showed that there would be an access road intersecting with Chinden Boulevard. Lochsa 
Falls then began constructing the subdivision in phases. It completed 11 of 12 phases of the 
subdivision, including constructing and/or putting in place the road that connected the 
subdivision to Chinden Boulevard. (R. 84). After obtaining final plat approval on the final, 
twelfth phase, Lochsa Falls was told that it could not obtain building pennits until it obtained a 
pennit from the Respondent State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Department (hereinafter 
"ITD"). to access Chinden Boulevard. (R. 83-85). Lochsa Falls then began the application 
process and was required as part of that process to obtain and attach a traffic study to its 
application. (R. 43). The engineer who perfonned the traffic study recommended that a traffic 
signal be installed. (R. 39). In completing the application for pennission to access Chinden 
Boulevard, Lochsa Falls was required to sign a statement that states: 
I certify that I am the Owner or Authorized Representative of the property 
to be served and request permission to construct the above facilities within the 
State Highway Rights-of-Way in accordance with the General Provisions printed 
on the reverse side of this form, the Special Provisions, and the Plans made a part 
of this permit. This pennit SHALL BE VOID if all work is not completed and the 
Department has no_t made final inspection and approval within one year of the 
issuance date. 
(R. 43). However, the application does not have any "facilities" described above the signature 
line. On or about November 19, 2004, ITD issued a pennit to Locsha Falls "to perfonn the 
work described." The only work described is contained on a separate piece of paper entitled 
"Special Provisions." (R. 44). The work described in the Special Provisions was not 
volunteered by Lochsa Falls, rather it was imposed by ITD. (R. 44) Specifically !TD required 
that Locsha Falls design and construct a traffic signal, a center tum lane, and a deceleration lane 
at the intersection of its subdivision and Chinden Blvd. Lochsa Falls had to provide a 
performance bond in the amount of $180,000 prior to beginning work. (R. 44). Lochsa Falls 
performed the work and provided the performance bond under protest. (R. 87). 
Lochsa Falls did not view its application to obtain access to Chinden Boulevard as a 
purchase and sale arrangement. Lochsa Falls owned and was developing the land adjacent to the 
State highway. Lochsa Falls' access road connecting to Chinden Boulevard was entirely within 
Lochsa Falls' property boundaries. Lochsa Falls to its knowledge was not purchasing any land 
and it has not received, to date, any deed to property. 
II. ARGUMENT. 
A. THE TRAFFIC SIGNAL BENEFITS THE PUBLIC AT LARGE. 
!TD argues: "The performance bond and the costs of constructing the new intersection 
are for the benefit of the property Lochsa Falls is developing. These items are not taxes or 
impact fees of any sort. In exchange for a property owner obtaining the right to use and improve 
ITD property for its benefit and ultimately obtaining a deeded right of access, ITD requires that 
the improvements built on state property meet state safety and design standards." This argument 
is wrong for three reasons: (1) all members of the public will benefit from this traffic signal, (2) 
this is a tax and/or an impact fee, and (3) Lochsa Falls has not and will not receive a property 
right. 
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First, all members of the traveling public will benefit from this traffic signal and other 
improvements not just those who live in Lochsa Falls' subdivision. Persons living both within 
and without the subdivision will benefit from the fact that cars coming from the subdivision are 
not turning into traffic traveling at 55 miles per hour. The entire traveling public will be safer 
with the signal and other improvements in place. Lochsa Falls is not contesting that fact. 
Lochsa Falls is contesting the fact that it as the developer is bearing the cost of keeping the 
traveling public safe. Even those persons living in the subdivision are not paying for the right to 
access Chinden Boulevard safely, the developer is bearing the entire cost. (R. 83). 
Second, this is either a tax or an impact fee. As argued previously taxes are revenue 
raising measures. In this case, ITD raised revenue to cover the cost of constructing a traffic 
signal and making improvements to the highway by making Lochsa Falls construct the signal 
and other improvements at its own expense. Alternatively, the condition to construct the signal 
and other improvements was the imposition of an impact fee. Impact fees are fees/taxes imposed 
on land developers to cover the costs of infrastructure and related services that would otherwise 
have to be provided by the government. In this case, again, ITD covered the cost of 
infrastructure by requiring Lochsa Falls to construct a new intersection and a traffic signal. !TD 
clearly does not have and has not even argued that it has the authority to tax or to impose impact 
fees. 
Third, Lochsa Falls is not receiving a property right. The State is retaining ownership to 
Chinden Boulevard and the traffic signal or perhaps ultimately the Ada County Highway District 
will obtain some new property interest in the intersection. Lochsa Falls, however, is not 
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obtaining any special right that other members of the general traveling public are being denied. 
Lochsa Falls is not being given the right to tell others that they cannot use the traffic signal or 
intersection. A "property right" has to include within it "the right to exclude others." Loretto v. 
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 433 (1982), quoting Kaiser Aetna v. 
United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (I 979). Even assuming that this is some type of property 
transfer, there does not appear to be any authority given by the Legislature to ITD to sell "deeded 
rights of access" to state highways. It is true that the Legislature has given the Idaho 
Transportation Board the power to designate state highways or parts of them as controlled-access 
facilities. Idaho Code § 40-3 I 0(9). However, the Legislature seems only to have given !TD the 
power to regulate or prohibit the use of those controlled access highways "by a class or kind of 
traffic which is incompatible with the normal and safe movement of traffic." Idaho Code § 49-
202(23). It does not appear that the Legislature has granted !TD the right to require those 
traveling to and from Lochsa Falls' subdivision to pay for access and yet allow other members of 
the public to have free access, e.g., homeowners in adjoining subdivisions who will utilize this 
traffic signal are not being required to contribute at all to the cost of the new intersection and 
traffic signal. 
Therefore, Lochsa Falls asks this Court to find that the new intersection and signal 
benefit the public at large and that such a benefit cannot be paid for at the expense of one 
developer. Lochsa Falls asks this Court to find that the conditions placed on Lochsa Falls during 
the application process amounted to a tax and/or impact fee and/or a taking without just 
compensation. 
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B. TRUE, EXHAUSTION WAS THE ISSUE, SO ALSO WERE THE EXCEPTIONS 
TO THE EXHAUSTION DOCTRINE. 
!TD argues that exhaustion of administrative remedies is the only issue that is before the 
Supreme Court. Lochsa Falls is arguing that this is a case that falls within the exceptions to the 
exhaustion doctrine. Lochsa Falls has identified a number of exceptions that might apply to this 
case. Rather than rehearse them all, Lochsa Falls will touch on just a few: 
1. ITD Does Not Have Authority to Tax. 
Lochsa Falls recognizes that "As a general rule, a party must exhaust administrative 
remedies before resorting to the courts to challenge the validity of administrative acts." Arnzen 
v. State, 123 Idaho 899, 854 P.2d 242 (I 993). However, there is an exception when the agency 
acts outside its authority. KMST, LLC v. County of Ada, 138 Idaho 577, 583(2003). Lochsa 
Falls' case falls within this exception. !TD acted outside its authority. The Legislature has not 
given !TD the power to tax or to impose impact fees. Thus, Lochsa Falls should not have to 
exhaust its administrative remedies as !TD is palpably without jurisdiction to impose such taxes. 
2. The IDAPA Rules are Facially Unconstitutional. 
Second, In Park v. Banbury, 149 P.3d 851,857, 2006 Ida. LEXIS 159 (2006) this Court 
recognized: 
Although facial challenges to the validity of a statute or ordinance need not 
proceed through administrative channels, as-applied challenges may be required 
to do so. In McCuskey, the Court recognized an exception where the property 
owner was challenging the validity of the zoning ordinance itself rather than a 
decision of the zoning authority. 123 Idaho at 660, 85 I P.2d at 956; cf Regan, 
140 Idaho at 725, JOO P.3d at 619 (finding an adequate administrative remedy 
where the party was challenging the interpretation rather than the constitutionality 
of the statute at issue). 
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Id. at 857 (emphasis added). Lochsa Falls is argumg that IDAPA 39.03.42.700, the 
administrative rule requiring developers to pay for traffic signals and other improvements, is 
invalid on its face, as !TD has not received authority from the Legislature to impose taxes or 
impact fees, and fmiher the rule allows a taking without just compensation. 
!TD argues that if this were a facial challenge Lochsa Falls would have the burden of 
showing that there is no set of circumstances under which the law would be valid. Lochsa Falls 
has established this point. The Legislature has never authorized !TD to impose taxes or impact 
fees, and the IDAPA regulation at issue states that !TD can require developers to pay for 
construction of highway modifications or improvements. !TD requiring applicants to pay for 
highway modifications or improvements under any set of circumstances would be an invalid 
exercise of the taxation power. 
3. Lochsa Falls has not Waived its Rights to Challenge the IDAPA 
Rule. 
!TD argues that Lochsa Falls somehow offered to pay for the construction of a new 
intersection and traffic signal. This is absolutely not the case. As part of the application process, 
ITD required Lochsa Falls to have a traffic study performed. IDAPA 39.03.42.301. That study 
recommended a new traffic signal. Despite that recommendation, !TD had the final decision 
making authority regarding whether to require a traffic signal as a condition of the access permit. 
Id., see also, IDAPA 39.03.42.700. Lochsa Falls did construct the signal and did provide a 
performance bond. This, however, was all done under protest. (R. 87). It was by no means 
volunteered as was the case in KMST LLC v. County of Ada, 138 Idaho 577 (2003). 
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III. CONCLUSION. 
For the foregoing reasons, Lochsa Falls respectfully requests that this Court find that 
IDAPA 39.03.42.700 is facially invalid to the extent it requires a developer to pay all costs 
associated with making improvements to state highways. Further, Appellant requests that this 
Court find that Appellant was not required to exhaust its administrative remedies. 
DATED This 20th day of November 2007. 
WILSON & McCOLL 
t/j// 
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